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Abstract. We present and validate a novel mathematical model of the
blockchain mining process and use it to conduct an economic evaluation of
the double-spend attack, which is fundamental to all blockchain systems.
Our analysis focuses on the value of transactions that can be secured under
a conventional double-spend attack, both with and without a concurrent
eclipse attack. We account for an attacker capable of increasing profits
by targeting multiple merchants simultaneously. Our model quantifies
the importance of several factors that determine the attack’s success,
including confirmation depth, attacker mining power, and a confirmation
deadline set by the merchant. In general, the security of a transaction
against a double-spend attack increases roughly logarithmically with the
depth of the block, made easier by the increasing potential profits, but
more difficult by the increasing proof of work required. We find that a
merchant requiring a single confirmation is protected against attackers
that possess as much as 10% of the mining power, but only provided that
the total value of goods at risk for double-spend is less than 100 BTC. A
merchant that requires a much longer 55 confirmations (≈9 hours) will
prevent an attacker from breaking even unless he possesses more than
35% of the current mining power, or the value of goods at risk exceeds
1M BTC.
1 Introduction
Despite the widespread adoption of blockchain-based digital currencies like
Bitcoin [16], there exists little guidance on the actual value of goods or services
that can be secured against double-spend attacks using blockchain transactions.
The need for understanding the risk has always been of paramount importance
to merchants; and the need is now shared by an increasing number of services
that leverage blockchain transactions for settlement. For example, sidechains [1]
and the Lightning Network [18] may be deployed shortly, and the security of each
depends heavily on the underlying security of the Bitcoin transactions from which
they are bootstrapped. Yet, all earlier studies of the economics of double-spend
attacks fall short because of the simplicity of their model and resulting inability
to capture the full complexity of the problem. In the present work, we derive a
novel, continuous-time model for the double-spend attack, and use it to evaluate
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the economics of the conventional attack; we also use it to evaluate the attack in
the presence of a concurrent eclipse attack [13], in which adversaries occlude a
targeted peer’s view of the majority’s blockchain.
Double-spend attacks cannot be prevented in blockchain currencies because
they are subject to the FLP impossibility result [10], which says, informally, that
consensus cannot be reached in distributed systems that do not set a deadline
for when messages (i.e., new blocks) can be received. The primary mitigating
defense against double-spends is for the merchant to wait for a transaction to
receive z confirmations (i.e., z − 1 blocks are added after the block in which it
originally appeared) before releasing goods to a customer. Nakamoto derived
the probability of success for that defense, but the result is limited because
it considers neither the cost of the attack, nor the revenue that the attacker
stands to gain. Moreover, although it has been shown that the eclipse attack
makes double-spending easier [13], no prior work has yet quantified the security
of a merchant’s transactions in such a case where her view of the blockchain is
obstructed.
Contributions. We contribute a novel economic evaluation of double-spend
attacks in Bitcoin that could easily be extended to similar blockchain currencies
such as Litecoin [14] or Zerocash [22]. We derive and validate equations for the
value of transactions that can be secured against a double-spending adversary,
who controls any portion of the mining power less than a majority. We also
evaluate the double-spend attack when conducted contemporaneously with the
eclipse attack.
Our results quantify Bitcoin’s security as a currency. We show that the correct
attacker model considers not just the attacker’s mining power and transaction
confirmation depth z, but also the attacker’s potential reward, or goods at risk,
which can be conservatively estimated by a merchant as the summed value
of coin in the z confirmation blocks that is exchanged between individuals
(turnover) [15,19]. We find that blockchain security against double-spend attacks
increases roughly logarithmically with block depth, made easier by increasing
goods at risk, but more difficult by the increasing proof of work required. Our
model also quantifies the synergistic value of a concurrent eclipse attack.
For example, when the summed turnover for a transaction’s first confirmation
block is as high as 100 BTC, we determine that a single confirmation is protected
against attackers that can increase the current mining power by no more than 10%.
Waiting for significantly more confirmations increases a transaction’s security
considerably. With 55 confirmations and aggregate turnover of up to 1M BTC, a
transaction can be protected from a double-spend attack as long as the attacker
possesses less than 35% of the current mining power. We also demonstrate
quantifiably that if merchants impose a conservative confirmation deadline, then
a concurrent eclipse attack can only make double-spends more profitable if the
attacker possesses less than 35% of the mining power or if the merchant requires
fewer than 10 confirmations.
2
2 Background and Related Work
Using a blockchain as a method for distributed consensus was first proposed by
Nakamoto as part of his or her development of the Bitcoin digital currency [16].
Blockchains allow for an open group of peers to reach consensus, while mitigating
Sybil attacks [7] and the limitations imposed by the FLP impossibility result [10]
through a mining process. We refer the uninitiated reader to Appendix A for
a detailed overview of blockchain consensus and Bitcoin. Additionally, several
articles are available that offer summaries of broader Bitcoin research issues [4,6,
25]. Below, we summarize two particularly relevant attacks, and then summarize
why our contributions are distinct from related work.
2.1 Relevant Attacks
Double spending. A fundamental attack against Bitcoin is the double-spend
attack [16], which works as follows. An attacker creates a transaction that moves
funds to a merchant’s address. After the transaction appears in the newest block
on the main branch, the attacker takes possession of the purchased goods. Using
his mining power, the attacker then immediately releases two blocks, with a
transaction in the first that moves the funds to a second attacker-owned address.
Now the attacker has the goods and his coin back. To defend against the attack,
a merchant can refuse to release goods to a Bitcoin-paying customer until z
blocks have been added to the blockchain including the first block containing
a transaction moving coin to the merchant’s address. Nakamoto calculated the
probability of the attack succeeding assuming that the miner controlled a given
fraction of the mining power [16]; for a given fraction, the probability of success
decreases exponentially as z increases.
In general, a merchant may wait z blocks before releasing goods, which
can thwart an attacker. But choosing the minimum value of z that secures a
transaction is an unresolved issue. The core Bitcoin client shows that a transaction
is unconfirmed until it is 6 blocks deep in the blockchain [3], and the advice from
researchers to policymakers can be vague; e.g., “for very large transactions, coin
owners might want to wait for a larger number of block confirmations” [5].
Eclipse attacks. Heilman et al. showed that Bitcoin’s p2p network peer discovery
mechanism is vulnerable to eclipse attacks [13], which occlude a victim peer’s
view of the blockchain. For example, if an adversary controls a botnet, he can fill
a peer’s table of possible neighbors, resulting in a very high chance the victim
will connect only to the attacker. Alternatively, the eclipse can involve controlling
a victim’s local connection to the Internet.
Heilman et al. also showed that eclipse attacks can be used as a tool to increase
the effectiveness of the double-spend attack on a merchant. First, the attacker
eclipses the merchant’s view of the blockchain. Then, he sends the merchant a
seemingly honest transaction H, which contains the payment for a good. Third,
the attacker sends to the miners a faulty transaction F that moves the funds
elsewhere. Next, he creates and sends a series of z blocks to the victim merchant
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such that H is part of the first block. Finally, he continues the eclipse until the
real blockchain has progressed by at least z + 1 blocks. At that point, he has
both the goods and the Bitcoin that the merchant intended to keep.
2.2 Related Work
Nakamoto derived the double-spend attack’s success probability in the original
Bitcoin paper [16]. The main limitation of this approach is that it fails to include
attack cost, which would place the severity of an attack in a real world context.
Moreover, the model itself is also overly simplified in that it models the creation
of an entire sequence of blocks as a single Poisson process. Accordingly, we cannot
rely on the accuracy of the model for large numbers of consecutive blocks, which
is necessary for determining the security of high-value transactions.
In their paper introducing the GHOST protocol [23], Sompolinsky et al.
extended Nakamoto’s model by incorporating network delays and by allowing
the expected block creation time to deviate from the 10-minute average used
today. With this model, they showed that double-spend attacks become more
effective as either the block size or block creation rate increase (when GHOST is
not used). With a trivial change, our work could also vary the expected block
creation time. A less trivial (but quite interesting) change would allow us to also
model network delays.
Sapirshtein et al. [21] first observed that some double-spend attacks can be
carried out essentially cost-free in the presence of a concurrent selfish mining [9]
attack. More recent work extends the scope of double-spends that can benefit
from selfish mining to cases where the attacker is capable of pre-mining blocks
on a secret branch at little or no opportunity cost [24] and possibly also under a
concurrent eclipse attack [11]. The papers identify the optimal mining strategy
for an attacker and quantify the advantage that he can expect to have over
the merchant in terms of pre-mined blocks. This analysis is complementary to
ours; it is possible to relatively easily incorporate the pre-mining advantage into
our model by simply changing the attacker’s block target from z to z − c. We
note that pre-mining in the context of the eclipse attack may not be feasible
since an eclipse cannot generally be carried out for an indefinite period of time.
Nevertheless, we intend to update both of our double-spend analyses to account
for cost-free pre-mining in future work.
The objective of Rosenfeld [20] is most similar to ours and his analysis
is a great improvement over the 6-block rule. However, his model cannot be
applied to the concurrent eclipse attack scenario and he makes several simplifying
assumptions that render the results for the conventional double-spend attack
less accurate than ours, particularly as the number of required confirmations, z,
grows (we compare quantitatively in Fig. 3). Additionally, his approach — as
well as all of those cited above — models only the order of block creation and
not block mining time explicitly. As a result, it is difficult to extend his results to
model cost in circumstances where the attacker is given a specific deadline (as we
have done in our eclipse attack analysis) or where an attacker drops out because
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the honest miners have already won. We develop a richer, continuous-time model
that explicitly accounts for attacker cost as a function of mining duration.
Heilman et al. offered a detailed analysis of the mechanics of an eclipse attack,
as well as several protocol-level defenses to the attack. But they attempted no
analysis of an attacker’s economic incentives. As a result, it remains unclear what
minimum number of confirmations, z, are sufficient to secure a given value of
purchased goods. In this paper, we derive a model for the profit received by an
adversary who launches an eclipse attack, and use it to determine the attacker’s
break-even point for various values of z.
3 Analysis of Double-spend and Eclipse Attacks
In this section, we compute the security of a transaction against a double-spend
attack, both with and without a concurrent eclipse attack, in cases where the
transacted coin is used as payment for goods or services, which we call goods
at risk. Specifically, we are able to determine the fraction of mining power q
required by an attacker to profitably double-spend a transaction given the value
of goods at risk v and transaction confirmation blocks z required by the target
(merchant, service, etc.). As we explain below, v is conservatively estimated as
not just the Bitcoin value of goods sold by a single merchant, but as the sum
amount of coins transferred between entities (turnover) by all transactions in the
z confirmation blocks. Our guiding principle is that a resource is secure from
an attack only if it is worth less than the attack’s cost. We find that because
of the well-behaved statistical properties of mining times and transparency of
transaction values, Bitcoin is particularly amenable to such an analysis.
Attack cases. In this section, we analyze two double-spend attack strategies.
Case 1 assumes that the attacker is capable of eclipsing the merchant while
conducting a double-spend attack. Case 2 assumes that the attacker elects not to
employ an eclipse attack (or equivalently, fails in an attempt to do so). Assuming
that the merchant follows our mitigation guidelines, we provide bounds on the
expected break-even point for the attacker in both cases. We find that there are
two distinct attack regimes where one case dominates the other based on the
attacker’s share of the mining power q. When q ≤ 0.35 and z remains relatively
low, Case 1 affords the attacker a lower break-even point. The opposite is true
for q ≥ 0.35 and large z, where Case 2 dominates.
Attack target. Throughout most of this section we proceed under the assump-
tion that the attacker targets a single merchant, which is not strictly true. First,
the target need not be an individual at all; the attacker could instead target
blockchain-based services. Second, he could exploit multiple targets simulta-
neously. We discus the ramifications of the former in Section 4 and the latter
presently. Simultaneous attacks increase the attacker’s potential profit by allowing
for multiple double-spends to be placed in a single block. Moreover, even if a
merchant requires z confirmations, the attacker might be lucky to find other
merchants requiring only one, which means that the attacker could potentially
profit from all z blocks. The potential profit in a block can be bounded by the
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sum of all Bitcoin transferred, or turned over, between distinct entities. We
call the aggregate turnover value for z blocks the z-maximal goods because it
represents the maximum Bitcoin value of goods that could be exploited by the
attacker in the z confirmation blocks. Several past works have evaluated metrics
for estimating that value [15,19]. Thus, we can model the simultaneous attack
scenario by letting the goods at risk, v, be equal to the z-maximal goods.
Mitigation measures. We assume that the merchant will take certain precau-
tions. First, because the attacker is capable of profiting from the z-maximal
goods, the merchant will set z adaptively based on the turnover of each block
as it is added to the blockchain. Specifically, she will only release goods after z
confirmations if the expected cost to an attacker exceeds the z-maximal goods.
Second, when the merchant is concerned about a simultaneous eclipse attack, she
will impose a deadline d for the receipt of all z confirmations. It is always possible
to double-spend against an eclipsed merchant — only the attack duration varies
based on the attacker’s fraction of mining power q — thus d serves to increase
the attacker’s cost by increasing his loss rate. Because z is set dynamically, d
would most naturally be defined as a linear function of z.
3.1 Attacker model
We make the following simplifying assumptions about the attack environment as
well as the attacker’s capabilities and behaviors.
– The attacker’s mining power constitutes a fraction 0 < q < 0.5 of the total
mining power. When q ≥ 0.5, the attacker holds a majority of the mining
power, in which case Bitcoin cannot secure any transaction.
– The network is correctly calibrated so that a block is produced roughly once
every 10 minutes given the current mining power, which is generally true in
the real system. Bitcoin adjusts its difficulty once every 2,016 blocks (about
every two weeks), and we assume these attacks have no affect on the difficulty
while they are run.
– The eclipse attack succeeds without fail. An eclipse attack is likely to incur
some cost, but we do not include it because that cost is hard to estimate.
For example, in the most general scenario, a botnet might be required [13].
On the other hand, if a merchant is physically accessible and has only a
single, unsecured wireless link to the Internet, eclipse attacks are much
simpler and much less costly. We also assume the attacker does not launch a
denial-of-service attack on honest miners.
Attacker strategy Case 1: The attacker launches an eclipse attack against
one or more merchants. He diverts his mining power, q, from the main branch
to mining an alternate fraudulent branch that contains in the earliest block a
transaction that moves coins to the merchant; the blocks are sent to the merchant
as they are mined. Once the attacker reaches z blocks on the fraudulent branch,
the merchant releases the goods to the attacker. The attacker ceases to mine on
the fraudulent branch, and waits until the main branch grows longer than the
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fraudulent branch. He then ceases to eclipse the merchant, allowing her to realize
that the actual longest branch does not contain the transaction that transferred
coin to her.
In principle, the attacker has an unlimited amount of time to produce the
z blocks he uses to unlock the goods from the merchant. He is limited only by
the amount of time he is able to eclipse the merchant and the time his is willing
to divert his mining power away from the main branch. However, the merchant
will likely suspect that she is being eclipsed if the actual time it takes for her
to receive z blocks is drastically different than the expected time (roughly 10
minutes per block). Therefore, we propose that the merchant refuse to hand over
the goods if the z blocks are not received by her deadline d, a parameter that we
described in our discussion of mitigation measures. Given this change in policy,
the attacker will naturally adjust to cease mining on the fraudulent branch once
he either mines z blocks or the deadline has passed. For this case, we do not
consider the possibility that the attacker attempts to replace the main branch
with his false branch, thus we assume that the coinbase rewards earned on the
fraudulent branch are useless.
Attacker strategy Case 2: No eclipse attack is leveraged, but the attacker
again possesses fraction q of the total mining power. This time, after releasing
the transaction that pays coin to the merchant, he races to mine z + 1 blocks
on a secret fraudulent branch that does not contain the transaction in any of its
blocks. Meanwhile, the rest of the miners have picked up the payment transaction
and added it to the main branch on which they mine. The merchant will release
the goods once the main branch reaches length z. The attacker does not release
any of his blocks until the fraudulent branch has reached length z + 1, at which
point he releases all block simultaneously. If the fraudulent branch is longer than
the main branch, then the attacker will have successfully double-spent the coins
that he originally transferred to the merchant.
A persistent attacker could conceivably continue to mine indefinitely, even
after the main branch far surpasses the fraudulent branch. There will remain,
in any case, a non-zero probability of success. However, one of Nakamoto’s
fundamental results is that there will be an exponentially diminishing probability
of success with every block that the attacker falls behind [16]. Moreover, the
cumulative cost will eventually become prohibitive to any rational attacker.
Therefore, we assume the attacker will eventually quit if he remains behind for a
sufficiently long period of time. Determining the optimal drop out point is left
for future work; here we arbitrarily assume that the attacker will drop out if
the main branch mines z + 1 blocks before he can. This choice has the desirable
property (for the attacker) that the expected cost for any outcome will not exceed
the cost he was willing to incur for a successful attempt.
3.2 Case 1 Analysis: Eclipse-Based Double-Spend
We determine Bitcoin’s security with respect to an eclipse-based double-spend
attack by quantifying a potential attacker’s economic break-even point. Break-
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even occurs when revenue R less cost C is zero:
R− C = 0. (1)
We assume an attacker has fraction q of total mining power, and the merchant
will not release goods until a paying transaction is z-blocks deep in the main
chain. If the zth block has not been announced by d minutes, the sale is nullified.
Let Xqi be a random variable representing the time it takes for the attacker
to mine the ith block using mining power q, and let
X =
z∑
i=1
Xqi . (2)
Here, X represents the time it takes the attacker to reach z blocks using mining
power q. Define C(x; d, q) to be the cost of an attack with duration x minutes
and deadline d that uses mining power q. To calculate cost, we assume that the
miner will stop mining once he mines the z blocks, but will continue to mine
until the deadline if he is unsuccessful. Cost can be measured in terms of the
opportunity cost for diverting the mining power from performing honest mining,
that is, the attacker could have earned the block reward of B from the main
branch. Blocks are mined, we expect, every 10 minutes. Therefore
C(x; d, q) =
{
qxB
10 , x ≤ d
qdB
10 , x > d
. (3)
Mining is an example of a Poisson process because, under constant mining
power, blocks are mined continuously and independently at a constant average
rate. Therefore Xqi ∼ exponential(β) with β = 10/q. It is well known that the
exponential distribution is a special case of the gamma distribution with shape
parameter α = 1. Furthermore, the sum of z gamma distributions with shape
α = 1 and the same rate β is again gamma with rate β and shape z. Thus
X ∼ gamma(z, 10/q). Let g(x;α, β) be the density function for the distribution
gamma(α, β), and let G(x;α, β) be the CDF. It follows that
E[C(X; d, q)] =
∫ ∞
0
C(x; d, q)g(x, z, β)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
C(x; d, q) 1
βz(z − 1)!x
z−1e−x/βdx
= qB10
[∫ d
0
1
βz(z − 1)!x
ze−x/βdx+ d(1−G(d, z, β))
]
= qB10
[
βz
∫ d
0
1
β(z+1)z!x
ze−x/βdx+ d(1−G(d, z, β))
]
= qB10
[
10z
q
G
(
d; z + 1, 10
q
)
+ d
(
1−G
(
d; z, 10
q
))]
= qdB10 + zBG(d; z+1,
10/q)− qdB10 G(d; z,
10/q). (4)
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Consider now the attacker’s revenue R(x; d). If he succeeds in the attack, then
he will earn revenue v and will earn nothing otherwise. Formally,
R(x; d) =
{
v, x < d
0, x ≥ d . (5)
The probability of his success is
P (X ≤ d) = G(d; z, 10/q). (6)
Hence the expected revenue is given by
E[R(X; d)] = vG(d; z, 10/q). (7)
Using the fact that expected break-even occurs when E[R(X; d)]−E[C(X; d, q)] =
0 we have our result for Case 1:
v = E[R(X; d)]
G(d; z, 10/q)
= E[C(X; d, q)]
G(d; z, 10/q)
=
qdB
10 + zBG
(
d; z+1, 10q
)
− qdB10 G
(
d; z, 10q
)
G(d; z, 10/q)
=
qdB
10 + zBG (d; z+1, 10/q)
G(d; z, 10/q) −
qdB
10 . (8)
3.3 Case 2 Analysis: Double-Spend Without The Eclipse Attack
In this case, we assume that an eclipse attack is not employed by the attacker.
By comparing results to Case 1, we can determine which is the more effective
attacker strategy. Recall that the attacker builds a fraudulent branch holding
the double-spend transaction, and honest miners build the main branch holding
the payment transaction. The attack succeeds if the fraudulent branch becomes
the main branch. No deadline is enforced by the merchant. She does, however,
enforce an embargo on goods until the payment transaction is z-blocks deep.
Let Y qi be a random variable denoting the time it takes the attacker to mine
the ith block if he controls fraction q of the total mining power. Similarly, define
Mqi to be the time it takes the honest miners to mine block i given that they
control fraction 1− q of the mining power. Finally, define
Y =
z+1∑
i=1
Y qi (9)
and
M =
z+1∑
i=1
Mqi (10)
to be the time it takes for the attacker and other miners, respectively, to mine
z + 1 blocks. For the attack to be a success, it must be the case that Y < M .
We assume that the attacker will stop mining when he reaches z + 1 blocks on
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the fraudulent branch or when the honest miners reach z + 1 blocks on the main
branch, whichever happens first.
Analogously to Section 3.2, we define C(y,m; q) as the cost to the attacker
when he possesses mining power q and the attacker and honest miners each mine
for y and m minutes respectively:
C(y,m; q) =
{
qyB
10 , y ≤ m
qmB
10 , y > m
. (11)
Just like X in Section 3.2, both Y and M have gamma distributions, this time
with rate parameters βY = 10/q and βM = 10/(1− q), respectively. Specifically,
Y ∼ gamma(z + 1, βY ) and M ∼ gamma(z + 1, βM ). Define g(x;α, β) and
G(x;α, β) as in Section 3.2. It follows that
E[C(Y,M ; q)] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
C(y,m; q) g(m; z+1, βM )g(y; z+1, βY ) dy dm
=
∫ ∞
0
g(m; z+1, βM )
(
qB
10
∫ m
0
yg(y; z+1, βY )dy +
qmB
10
∫ ∞
m
g(y; z+1, βY )dy
)
dm
= qB10
(∫ ∞
0
g(m; z + 1, βM )
∫ m
0
yg(y; z + 1, βY ) dy dm+∫ ∞
0
mg(m; z + 1, βM )
∫ ∞
m
g(y; z + 1, βY ) dy dm
)
= qB10
(∫ ∞
0
g(m; z + 1, βM )
∫ m
0
βY (z + 1)g(y; z + 2, βY ) dy dm+∫ ∞
0
βM (z + 1)g(m; z + 2, βM )
∫ ∞
m
g(y; z + 1, βY ) dy dm
)
= qB(z + 1)10
(
βY
∫ ∞
0
g(m; z, βM )G(m; z + 2, βY ) dm+
βM
∫ ∞
0
g(m; z + 1, βM ) (1−G(m; z + 1, βY )) dm
)
= B(z + 1)
(∫ ∞
0
g(m; z, 10/(1− q))G(m; z + 2, 10/q) dm+
q
1− q
∫ ∞
0
g(m; z + 1, 10/(1− q))
(
1−G(m; z + 1, 10/q)
)
dm
)
. (12)
To determine the attacker’s expected break-even point, we must also calculate
his expected revenue. For any given z, the attacker’s revenue when it took him y
minutes to mine z + 1 blocks on the fraudulent branch while it took the other
miners m minutes to mine z + 1 blocks on the main branch is given by
R(y,m; z) =
{
v + (z + 1)B, y < m
0, y ≥ m . (13)
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Fig. 1: For an attacker with mining power q, these plots show the value of goods at
risk v required to expect to break even given the merchant’s confirmation requirement
z. An eclipse-based double-spend attack (Case 1, Eq. 8) appears in green; a standard
double-spend attack (Case 2, Eq. 18) appears in red. For the eclipse attack we set the
deadline to d = 10z minutes. An alternative visualization of the equations appears
in the appendix, Figure 5. Results from our model are shown as solid lines; results
from an independent Monte Carlo simulation are shown as a dashed line. Rosenfeld’s
model [20] of Case 2 is shown in blue.
Revenue differs from that collected in Case 1 because the successful attacker
will earn the coinbase reward for each block he mines. The probability of attack
success is equal to
P [Y < M ] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ m
0
g(m; z+1, 10/(1− q))g(y; z+1, 10/q) dy dm
=
∫ ∞
0
g(m; z+1, 10/(1− q))G(m; z+1, 10/q) dm. (14)
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Therefore, the expected revenue can be calculated as
E[R(Y,M ; z)] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ m
0
(v + (z+1)B)g(m; z+1, 10/(1− q))g(y; z+1, 10/q)dy dm
= (v + (z+1)B)
∫ ∞
0
g(m; z+1, 10/(1− q))G(m; z+1, 10/q)dm
= (v + (z+1)B) P [Y < M ]. (15)
The expected break-even point is value of v for which revenue minus cost is zero.
E[R(Y,M ; z)]− E[C(Y,M ; q)] = 0. (16)
Substituting for revenue,
(v + (z+1)B)P [Y < M ] = E[C(Y,M ; q)], (17)
and rearranging, we have our result for Case 2 as follows:
v =E[C(Y,M ; q)]− (z + 1)BP [Y < M ]
P [Y < M ]
v =E[C(Y,M ; q)]
P [Y < M ] − (z + 1)B. (18)
Note that Eq. 18 is fully expressed by substituting Eqs. 12 and 14.
4 Discussion
In this section, we use the derivations from the previous section to quantitatively
compare attacker strategies and discuss implications for blockchain systems and
their users. In addition to the assumptions outlined in Section 3, we fix the
deadline at d = 10z for Case 2, which implies that the merchant will release
the goods only if the payment transaction receives z confirmations within 10z
minutes. We discuss the practical ramifications of this choice later in this section.
Accuracy of model. Fig. 1 compares Eqs. 8 and 18, the break-even value for a
rational attacker performing a double-spend attack with and without eclipsing
the merchant, respectively. In general, the break-even point increases with z, and
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for lower values of q the break-even point grows particularly rapidly. Thus we
limit z ≤ 4 for small q in order to more easily discern the differences between
curves on the same axes. An alternative visualization of the equations appears in
the appendix, Fig. 5. Fig. 1 also includes the results of an independent Monte
Carlo (MC) simulation of both attacks, executed thousands of times for each
point and is in very close agreement with our model.
Better to eclipse or not? Whether using an eclipse attack is an advantage to
the attacker depends on both q and z. Fig. 2 shows that the concurrent eclipse
attack of Case 1 affords the attacker with a lower break-even point (which is
advantageous) than Case 2 for relatively low values of z; the advantage holds for
fewer values of z as q increases. Indeed, once q > 0.35 or z ≥ 10, Case 2 always
offers a lower break-even point than Case 1. The precise regime where one case
dominates the other depends on the choice of deadline d in Case 1. A longer
deadline will decrease the cost for the attacker, which will lower his break-even
point, and tend to enlarge the green region in Fig. 2. Nevertheless, we expect
that Case 2 will always dominate Case 1 for large z because the fraudulent chain
replaces the main chain in the latter case, earning the attacker the cumulative
block reward.
Comparison to Rosenfeld [20]. Rosenfeld offers a model for v that is directly
comparable to what we call Case 2 (double-spend without the eclipse attack),
but his model is not capable of addressing Case 1. In terms of our notation, his
model yields the bound v > (1 − r)zB/r, where r is a discrete model1 of the
attacker’s probability of success given z and q. Fig. 1 plots his model next to ours
as well as our independent Monte Carlo simulation results. His model provides a
reasonable fit for q = 0.3, but is not accurate otherwise; the error in Rosenfeld’s
1 Specifically, Eq. 1 in [20].
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model tends to increase with z. For example, when q = 0.04 and z = 4, his model
over-shoots the MC results by almost 35%, and when q = 0.4 and z = 10 his
model underestimates the true break-even point by over 40%.
Revenue required to break even. In general, double-spending attacks are
more efficient with higher mining power q and goods at risk v. Higher q means
less risk of losing, and higher v means greater potential profit. Each curve in
Fig. 3 represents a single value for goods at risk and shows how the mining power
necessary for the attacker to break even varies with z2. For each pair of values v
and z, the minimum q value from the most effective double-spend attack strategy
is reported in the plot (the case that breaks even for lowest value q).
From the plot we can see that, for low values of z, even attackers with limited
mining power can break even for low values of goods at risk. On the other hand,
as the merchant increases z, the required mining power increases rapidly for low
v. For example, an attack with 1M BTC goods at risk (purple curve) can be
successful with relatively low mining power, q = 0.25, as long as the merchant
keeps z less than 25. But a lower value v, such as 1K BTC (yellow curve), would
require the attacker to possess mining power q = 0.42 for the same value z.
Determining value of goods at risk. The attacker’s potential profit has a
strong impact on his break-even point, and that profit is directly related to
the goods at risk v. Thus, it is imperative that the merchant understand the
scope of the attack. If she is confident that a potential attacker will target her
alone, then the goods at risk can safely be assumed to be equal to the value of
the goods she is personally trading for coin. On the other hand, if she would
2 In Fig. 3, Case 1 values are easily generated directly from Eq. 8; the equation contains
no integrals and most scientific software packages can deliver values from the gamma
distribution. In contrast, Case 2 involves a somewhat difficult integration (with
no analytical solution), and numerical integration packages fail for portions of our
parameter space. We instead used Monte Carlo integration — a distinct technique
from the Monte Carlo simulation discussed above — to generate points from Eq. 18
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like to be conservative, then the merchant must assume that the attacker is
capable of capturing the aggregate turnover in all confirmation blocks, which is
the z-maximal goods at risk.
Fig. 4 shows the actual median aggregate total and turnover values for consec-
utively mined blocks during the month of July 2016 (data source: blockchain.info).
Each point should be thought of as the typical sum of all outputs for the trans-
actions or typical turnover value for the given number of consecutive blocks. The
plot shows that the merchant can significantly bound the attacker’s potential
revenue by measuring turnover as opposed to using total block output value.
Aggregate turnover values can be used in conjunction with Fig. 3 to determine
the merchant’s security against an attacker who is capable of capturing the
z-maximal goods. For example, if the merchant requires z = 6 confirmations,
and the observed aggregate z-block turnover is similar to the median aggregate
turnover of 10K BTC, then she can be confident that she is protected against
double-spends from an attacker with q ≤ 0.18.
Attacks by new miners. Thus far we have assumed that the attacker is a
defecting miner, but it is also possible that a third party may bring new mining
power to these attacks (purchased or, for example, stolen via a botnet), which we
call expansion. Recall that we assume the hash difficulty remains the same during
the attack, so regardless of how the attacker garners mining power, he is always
capable of mining the same expected number of blocks in a given period of time.
An attacker who expands the mining power does not change our earlier analysis
in Case 1 because the attacker is mining on a fraudulent branch that will never
actually be publicly released. Therefore the salient factors, opportunity cost and
mining rate, do not change. However the analysis does change for Case 2 because
the attacker must compete with the other miners to grow his fraudulent branch
longer than the main branch. For example, when an attacker with 1/3 of the
existing mining power defects, he can expect to mine approximately 1/32/3 = 1/2
of all mined blocks. In contrast, when expanding the mining power by 1/3, the
attacker only expects to mine blocks at approximately 1/31+1/3 = 4/9 the rate of
the rest of the miners. Our existing analysis models the former scenario, but
can easily be adjusted to model the latter by changing the honest miner block
creation rate from βM = 10/(1− q) to βM = 10.
Coinbase and fees. Bitcoin’s security is critically related to the reward for
mining. On July 9, 2016, the rewarded coinbase halved from B = 25 to B = 12.5.
All of our analysis assumes that B = 12.5. In 2020, Bitcoin’s security against
double-spends will decrease further since the coinbase reward will halve again. A
lower block reward absent higher fees or a significant increase in Bitcoin’s fiat-
exchange value will make it cheaper for attackers to procure a higher percentage
of the mining power. Hence, if conditions remain the same except for a decrease
in coinbase reward, then merchants will need to wait for more confirmations
before releasing goods.
Setting the deadline. Our mitigation measures recommend that the merchant
set a deadline d when she suspects that there is risk of a concurrent eclipse and
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double-spend attack. Lower values of d increase the break-even value for the
attacker, which increases security. The downside to securing goods with a shorter
deadline is that honest customers may not succeed in meeting the deadline due
to the inherent randomness of block discovery. For example, according to actual
block mining data we collected from 2016, only about 60% of consecutive blocks
of length z actually arrived within a deadline of d = 10z minutes. Therefore, it
is wise for the merchant and customer to agree on a contingency plan for cases
where the deadline is missed. In many cases the customer will trust the merchant
to issue a refund. In more adversarial settings, a third-party escrow service can
be used to enforce a fair exchange of coin before the goods are released [17]. If
neither solution is acceptable, then the deadline should be relaxed so that the
chances the entire mining community miss it are very small.
Advice to Bitcoin merchants. Because it is impossible to know how many
merchants will be targeted simultaneously, we recommend that merchants always
choose v equal to the z-maximal goods they observe for the z blocks beginning
with the one that confirms their transaction. Merchants are best off setting z to
address one of two cases. (1) Least conservatively, merchants could trust powerful
miners to not carry out double-spend attacks, and assume that the common case
is an attacker that has q ≤ 0.1 of the mining power. In this case, z = 1 thwarts
attackers when goods at risk are below 100 BTC, even under an eclipse attack.
(2) Very conservatively, merchants can require z = 55 confirmations (a little
over 9 hours), which protects them against an attacker controlling q ≤ 0.35 of
the mining power even with goods at risk worth as much as 1M BTC (currently
about $700M).
Applications to off-chain and side-chain protocols. In its full generality,
our analysis quantifies the security of an exchange of some off-blockchain quantity
for Bitcoin. For most of this section, we have imagined a merchant trading
physical goods or services. But our results apply equally to many systems that
rely on or assume a stable blockchain, including sidechains [1], micropayment
channels such as the Lightning Network [18] and TumbleBit [12], and the XIM
decentralized mix service [2].
All these alternate protocols require a certain transaction, T , be confirmed in
a Bitcoin block that locks or moves coin while in use by the other protocol. If
the Bitcoin miners subsequently switch to a branch that doesn’t include T (or
worse, includes a transaction that prohibits T ’s validity in future blocks), then a
reorganization of the alternate protocol’s blockchain or transaction is required,
resulting in havoc. Unfortunately, due to the FLP impossibility result [10], it is
always possible for an attacker with sufficient resources to force a reorganization.
And so in all cases, these protocols vaguely recommend the block containing the
transaction reach a sufficient depth. For example, Back et al [1] recommends that
“a typical confirmation period would be on the order of a day or two.” Sasson [22]
recommends that users with “sensitive transactions only spend coins relative to
blocks further back in the ledger”.
Using our analysis, the confirmation depth required for T can be more
precisely calculated, and the risk of the reorganization can be quantified as
16
follows. First, participants wait for T to be confirmed in a block. Then as
confirmations accumulate, participants can use a resource like figure Fig. 3
(which can be constructed for arbitrary parameter combinations using Eqs. 8
and 18) to determine the their security (in terms of attacker mining power q)
given the current goods at risk. Eventually, they should settle on z confirmations
such that the security is considered to be sufficiently high for their purposes.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a novel economic model of Bitcoin double spend attacks that
incorporates the depth of the block containing the transaction of interest, the
attacker’s mining power, goods at risk, and coinbase reward. Based on this model,
we have shown that the security of a transaction increases roughly logarithmically
with the number of confirmations that it receives, where an attacker benefits
from the increasing goods at risk but is also throttled by the increasing proof
of work required. Additionally, we have demonstrated that, if merchants impose
a conservative confirmation deadline, the eclipse attack does not increase an
attacker’s profit when his share of the mining power is less than 35% or more
than 10 confirmations are required.
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A Blockchain and Bitcoin Overview
The mining process places peers with significant computational power at an
advantage, but overall, incentivizes miners to reach consensus. Bitcoin and follow-
on currencies, such as Litecoin [14], Zerocash [22], Ethereum [8], and many
others [4], also use the blockchain algorithm to manage an electronic payment
system.
Bitcoins exist as balance in a set of accounts called addresses. Bitcoin users
exchange money through transactions, which transfer Bitcoin from one set of
address to another. Transactions are broadcast over Bitcoin’s p2p network where
they are picked up by miners. Miners each independently agglomerate a set of
transactions into a block, verify that the transactions are valid, and attempt to
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Fig.5: An alternate visualization of Case 1 (Eq. 8) and Case 2 (Eq. 18) using a
logscale on y axis.
solve a predefined proof-of-work problem involving this block and all prior valid
blocks. In Bitcoin, this process is dynamically calibrated to take approximately
ten minutes per block. Under ordinary, non-adversarial, conditions, the first
miner to solve the proof-of-work problem broadcasts her solution to the network,
adding it to the ever-growing blockchain; the miners then start over, trying to add
a new block containing the set of transactions that were not previously added.
A transaction appearing in a block is considered confirmed. When z−1 blocks
have been added after the confirming block, the transaction is said to have
received z confirmations. If two miners discover a new block simultaneously, the
blockchain will bifurcate. Miners will attempt to add to the branch with greatest
cumulative proof-of-work. All miners will subsequently switch to mining on the
first branch that grows longer. As incentive, all miners insert, as the first item
in their block, a coinbase transaction, which is the protocol-defined creation of
new coins and a transfer of those coins into a address of their choosing. In doing
so, they have mined those coins and made the chosen address and its balance
valid in future transactions. Miners also receive a small fraction of the face value
of all transactions in the block that they successfully add to the blockchain;
this transaction fee overhead serves to incentivize miners even after the last
protocol-defined bitcoin is mined. Miners are commonly organized into mining
pools, which allow many miners to pool together their resources. In these pools,
rewards are split equitably according to the amount of resources they contributed
to creating a block.
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